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Introduction
In “Expectant Fathers, Abortion, and Embryos,” Dara
Purvis considers the interests of “expectational fathers,”
as she calls them, in the related contexts of abortion
and the disposition of pre-embryos in assisted reproductive technologies (ART).1 Her thought-provoking
essay contributes to a subject — men and reproductive
decision-making — that is too little studied. I embrace
her emphasis on respect for both men’s equal role in
parenting and women’s right to decide whether to
terminate or continue pregnancy. In this Comment,
I examine her central concern that abortion discourse
promotes harmful gender stereotypes by minimizing
expectational fathers’ interests. I suggest that Purvis’s
own analytic focus on intent, properly applied and
extended, actually ameliorates her concern and points
instead to a more direct, unapologetic acknowledgement of men’s (and women’s) desires to avoid parenthood in particular circumstances and at particular
times in their lives.
For most individuals, avoidance of parenthood is
fully consistent with loving and shared parenthood
of existing or future children; most men and women
desire parenthood, but not as a result of every act of
sexual intercourse. Policies that empower men and
women to avoid unintended pregnancy are the sensible, win-win, front-line approach to addressing disputes over abortion between expectational fathers and
women.

Intent and Stereotypes
Purvis’s principal concern centers on the related concepts of intent and gender stereotypes. She generally
supports a more robust role for intent in resolving
ART disputes2 and worries that adding abortion to the
analysis may undermine that position: “[I]f some of
the rhetoric debating abortion rights minimizes the
expectational parental interest of men, does that rhetoric work at cross-purposes to…application of intentbased rules in other contexts?”3 Similarly, Purvis posits that abortion discourse unfairly portrays men as
uninterested in childbearing, which in turn perpetuates gender stereotypes about women. She cites in
particular abortion opponents’ contention that men
should have the right to avoid parental responsibility because women have the right to decide whether
to continue the pregnancy: “By turning from narratives of men saddened by abortion, who had hoped
to become fathers, and focusing on unwilling fathers
whose parental investment was limited to sending
Dawn Johnsen, J.D., is the Walter W. Foskett Professor at
Indiana University Maurer School of Law, where she teaches
constitutional law.
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checks, abortion critics reinforce the…perception of
men as uninvested in children….”4
One relatively minor point regarding Purvis’s assertion that abortion opponents bear responsibility for a
harmful minimization of expectational fathers’ interests: I suspect that advocates who oppose child support obligations when women continue pregnancies
against men’s wishes are largely distinct from abor-

enthood at the time of sexual intercourse. As Purvis
discusses, however, there is no succinct analogue to
“pregnant woman” to describe a man who would be
the genetic father of a child who would be born to a
woman if she decides to continue a pregnancy and
successfully carries to term (fifteen to twenty percent
of known pregnancies end in miscarriage). This full
description is quite cumbersome, which reflects the
complexity of the potential relationship.
Second, regarding stereotypes: Purvis certainly is correct that governmenMore fundamentally, I question Purvis’s
tal actors and ordinary citizens alike
should be vigilant against the pernicious,
central assumption that prevailing abortion
often unconscious influences of gender
discourse inappropriately minimizes the
stereotypes on issues of pregnancy and
interests of expectational fathers, either to
childrearing. Judges, for example, sometimes confuse biological difference and
the detriment of the proper role of intent or
social construct, including by conflating
the advancement of stereotypes.
childbearing and childrearing.7 However,
far from promoting harmful stereotypes,
acknowledging that in most instances
tion opponents who would compel all women to conneither men nor women want a child to result from
tinue pregnancies. There may be some overlap in the
a particular act of sexual intercourse is vital to effecgroups, but the arguments clearly are distinct. Roe v.
tive public policy. A more complete understanding of
Wade5 actually has been cited to support the arguthe realities of pregnancy, childbearing, and abortion
ment that men’s relative lack of control of parenthood
points to policies that address — indeed, preempt —
should relieve men of financial liability. Conversely,
abortion disputes by reducing unintended pregnancy.
many who oppose abortion on the view that life begins
at conception would recognize that allowing men to
Non-Procreative Sex and Intentional
avoid child support would be counterproductive to
Parenthood
their anti-abortion goals.
A desire to engage in sexual intercourse without riskMore fundamentally, I question Purvis’s central
ing parenthood is not a wholesale rejection of parentassumption that prevailing abortion discourse inaphood, by men or women. It is, quite simply, a sentiment
propriately minimizes the interests of expectational
shared at some point by almost all people who have
fathers, either to the detriment of the proper role of
sexual intercourse with opposite sex partners. Those
intent or the advancement of stereotypes. First, as to
same individuals also typically desire parenthood —
intent: an accurate portrayal of men’s lack of interest
not as a potential result of every heterosexual encounin parenting in the context of abortion decisions need
ter, but at a time and with a partner of their choosing.
not adversely affect the role intent should play in ART
Virtually all American women who have sex with men
disputes for the simple reason that intent plays a funuse contraception at some point in their lives.8 Eightydamentally different role in the two contexts. When a
five percent of women and seventy-six percent of men
man and a woman decide to employ ART, it is with the
will have a child by age forty.9 An estimated three in
intent and for the purpose of having a child. Parentten women will have an abortion in their long reprohood is the desired outcome. Disputes that arise about
ductive lifetimes, but those same women bear chilpre-embryo disposition typically result from changed
dren and are mothers.10 Contrary to stereotypes, most
circumstances. In sharp contrast, the vast majorwomen who have abortions are mothers: Sixty-one
ity of abortions follow from a pregnancy that neither
percent have at least one child, and thirty-four percent
party intended; relatively few result from changed
have two or more children.11 In one study, nearly four
circumstances.6
in ten women cited among the reasons for having an
In fact, use of the phrase “expectational fathers” in
abortion that they had completed their childbearing,
the context of abortion, although a clear improvement
and almost one-third said that they were not ready to
over “father” alone, is far from ideal because typically
have a child.12
neither party will have had an expectation of par-
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The unintended pregnancy rate in the United
States is extraordinarily high at half of all pregnancies,
amounting to more than three million a year; about
forty percent of women decide to terminate and sixty
percent decide to continue an unintended pregnancy.13
Where the decision is contrary to men’s wishes, men
suffer a real and consequential loss of procreative control. In the cases where abortion results, a man may
suffer emotional distress from the loss of a desired
child or the belief that abortion is the moral equivalent
of killing a person. When a woman chooses to continue an unintended pregnancy, the course of a man’s
life can be greatly altered by unplanned parenthood,
particularly if the woman is not his chosen life partner. Although the responsible and legally mandated
course is to pay child support and be a loving father,
we should not deny the complexity and costs of this
real-world situation.

outside of marriage, the forced notification requirement touched only about one percent of expectational fathers.16 The impact on those women, however,
often would have been devastating. The Casey Court
explained, “In well-functioning marriages, spouses
discuss important intimate decisions such as whether
to bear a child. But there are millions of women in this
country who are the victims of regular physical and
psychological abuse at the hands of their husbands.”17
Battering, which can include marital rape, can escalate
with news of a pregnancy and also may extend to the
couple’s children. “[T]he primary reason women do
not notify their husbands is that the husband and wife
are experiencing marital difficulties, often accompanied by incidents of violence.”18
Attempts to restrict abortion have escalated in
recent years, but given Casey’s strong holding against
mandated husband notification, restrictions have

As the four Justices dissenting in Hobby Lobby noted, however, an IUD can
cost up to a month’s salary for an employee earning minimum wage and
struggling to provide for a family. Our nation accrues enormous benefits
— including the avoidance of abortion disputes between women and
expectational fathers — by assisting women and men in their efforts to time
the birth of children for when they are best able to bear and care for them.
The Supreme Court on Men and Abortion
The U.S. Supreme Court captured much of this when
it first addressed the issue of government-mandated
husband consent to abortion in 1976. A husband has
a “deep and proper concern and interest…in his wife’s
pregnancy,” but “when the wife and husband disagree
on this decision, the view of only one…can prevail.”
The Court held that the woman must prevail because
“it is the woman who physically bears the child and
who is the more directly and immediately affected by
the pregnancy.”14 In its second and most recent decision on the issue, Planned Parenthood v. Casey, the
Supreme Court in 1992 helped dispel some important stereotypes about the nature of such disputes. 15
Casey is best known for its five-four partial reaffirmation of Roe v. Wade, but the outcome was mixed: the
Court upheld some challenged provisions in a Pennsylvania law, but held unconstitutional a requirement
that a woman notify her husband before obtaining an
abortion.
As the Court explained, the vast majority of women
(about ninety-five percent) voluntarily involve their
husbands in abortion decisions. Given these voluntary consultations and the incidence of pregnancy
abortion and art • summer 2015

taken other forms, usually aimed at shutting down
providers of abortion services.19 Before Casey, however, the anti-abortion movement sought to create a
test case to overrule Roe through the dissemination of
a “Fathers’ Rights Litigation Kit.”20 The sample proceedings in the “kit” sparked lawsuits by men seeking
to block women’s abortions, until the Supreme Court
made clear it would not take such a case.21 I served as
co-counsel representing those women, who suffered
harassment, privacy intrusions, and delays until courts
vindicated their rights; those cases, too, involved dysfunctional, sometimes abusive relationships. Again,
the men who have sought to enlist the force of government to compel childbirth — or to avoid child support
payments — are not representative of the vast majority of men, who work out difficult decisions and disagreements in the context of personal relationships.

Conclusion
This extension of Purvis’s focus on intent points to the
vital role government plays in empowering women
and men to avoid unintended pregnancy. The rate of
unintended pregnancy in the United States is substantially higher than in other developed nations,22
343
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with rates highest among economically disadvantaged
women.23 A typical American woman wishing to have
only two children must spend three decades avoiding
the ten or more unintended pregnancies that would
result absent effective contraception.24 The Affordable
Care Act as implemented by the Obama Administration took a vital step toward filling unmet need by
including contraception among the health care provided at no additional cost under covered insurance
plans. Notwithstanding the Supreme Court’s 2014
Hobby Lobby decision allowing certain employers to
act upon religious beliefs to deprive their employees
of this valuable benefit,25 most health plans will make
available effective contraceptive methods that otherwise might not have been affordable. For example, the
hormonal intrauterine device (IUD) is forty-five times
more effective than oral contraceptives and ninety
times more effective than condoms, based on typical
use.26 As the four Justices dissenting in Hobby Lobby
noted, however, an IUD can cost up to a month’s salary for an employee earning minimum wage and
struggling to provide for a family.27 Our nation accrues
enormous benefits — including the avoidance of abortion disputes between women and expectational
fathers — by assisting women and men in their efforts
to time the birth of children for when they are best
able to bear and care for them.
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